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DOMESTICATING THE GERRYMANDER:
AN ESSAY ON STANDARDS, FAIR
REPRESENTATION, AND THE NECESSARY
QUESTION OF JUDICIAL WILL
Luis Fuentes-Rohwert
From the time the Supreme Court officially entered the famed "po-
litical thicket" in Baker v. Carr, its role in regulating the law of democ-
racy has been robust and aggressive. While Baker itself was a modest,
necessary jolt to the stagnant political structures of the times, the Court's
intervention in the field of democracy has exceeded all expectations, to
the point that the nature and scope of the legal questions presented hardly
matter anymore. This phenomenon has been characterized by a leading
commentator as the "constitutionalization of democratic politics.",
The Court's commitment to securing and exercising its own power
is so strong that instances when the Court appears to deviate from this
general script demand an explanation. This Essay focuses on one such
instance: Vieth v. Jubelirer,2 the recent Pennsylvania gerrymandering
case. In Vieth, four members of the Court concluded that political gerry-
mandering questions are devoid of judicially manageable standards and
are thus unfit for judicial resolution, while four other members were
equally confident that standards were readily available. Unable to adopt
a standard as his own, yet unsure that the field should be immune from
judicial review, Justice Kennedy retreated to familiar ground-the
Court's middle-and split the difference, agreeing with the plurality that
a standard was unavailing yet refusing to foreclose the inquiry into the
future. In so doing, Justice Kennedy left the issue open for the near
future, in case a standard arose that met his exacting requirements. 3
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University - Bloomington School of Law.
Thanks to Guy Charles, Ken Dau-Schmidt and Ajay Mehrotra for terrific comments on previ-
ous drafts.
I Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION 155 (Ronald Dworkin ed., The New Press 2002); see Richard H. Pildes, The Theory
of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1606, 1606 (1999) ("In the relatively short time since
[Baker], the United States Supreme Court has not only entered the 'political thicket,' but with
remarkable speed has found conflicts of democratic politics coming to dominate its docket.").
2 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
3 For an argument that no such standard will ever arise, see Richard L. Hasen, Looking
for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3
ELECTION L.J. 626 (2004).
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This Essay argues that the Vieth case is incoherent and ultimately
indefensible. In the abstract, Vieth is a curious case. Although the Court
is quite comfortable policing the political terrain, it goes to great lengths
in Vieth to step aside in order to remove political gerrymandering claims
from its docket. And herein lies its incoherency: while the plurality ap-
proaches gerrymandering claims as a separate area of analysis, these
claims form a subset of a larger arena opened up to judicial review by
Baker v. Carr. Political gerrymandering claims are part and parcel of the
reapportionment revolution and Vieth is but a modem remake of Baker v.
Carr. On this argument, the Court is faced with a stark choice: it must
forge ahead and create standards out of whole cloth, as in the redistrict-
ing context, or else it must leave the field of politics altogether and return
to a world where Colegrove v. Green-the case traditionally understood
as the classic political question case-is controlling precedent. It cannot
have it both ways.
This Essay examines Vieth and its place within the reapportionment
revolution over the course of five Parts. Part I examines the Court's
original reasons for staying off the political field, as explained in Justice
Frankfurter's controlling opinion in Colegrove v. Green. In turn, Part II
contrasts these reasons with the Court's ultimate and perhaps inevitable
decision to enter the field full force in Baker v. Carr and its immediate
progeny. Taken together, these Parts underscore the fact that the ques-
tion of judicial intervention has always been a question of judicial will.4
Part III moves the story ahead a mere two years, when the Court squarely
addressed the question of judicial standards in Reynolds v. Sims.5 Reyn-
olds settled this question forcefully and decisively, even if its solution
was no better than the "uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed applica-
tion of sixth-grade arithmetic."' 6 Part IV places the story in its proper
context post-Reynolds, as a quest for a working definition of fair repre-
sentation. This is a struggle that haunts the Court to this day. Finally,
Part V situates Vieth within this struggle.
I.
Any discussion about the role of the federal courts in redistricting
controversies must begin with Colegrove v. Green, a 1946 challenge to
the Illinois congressional districting plan. There are many reasons for
beginning here, not the least of which is that Colegrove offers a perspec-
4 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 44
(1962) ("The point decided in Baker v. Carr was not what function the Court is to perform in
legislative apportionment, and certainly not whether it is to take over full management, but
whether it can play any role at all.").
5 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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tive that the Court has long left behind; a humble and deferential institu-
tion willing to step aside when it determines that the facts so demand.
More crucially, for many years Colegrove stood for the proposition that
the Court must stay out of redistricting controversies no matter how egre-
gious the circumstances might appear. This was the classic political
thicket, an area where the judiciary must enter only at its own risk.
In an opinion authored by Justice Frankfurter, the Court offers myr-
iad reasons for refusing to intervene in this area. The Court begins by
looking to Wood v. Broom, the case adduced by the lower court as con-
trolling precedent. 7 According to Wood, Congress had eliminated a pre-
existing requirement of population equality for congressional districts
with the Reapportionment Act of 1929. Elections subsequently took
place under this understanding of the Act, and Congress did not respond
to the Court's interpretation under Wood. This lack of response seemed
to confirm the Court's reading of the Act and Congress' intentions. 8 And
in this area, for Justice Frankfurter, Congress' intentions control.
The argument was simple enough and took very little effort. What
could be easier than a contention that precedent ties one's hands? Yet
Justice Frankfurter is clearly after bigger game, and one did not have to
wait long to find out what it was. In the next paragraph, Frankfurter
argues that this litigation must be dismissed for "want of equity." 9 This
is his familiar point about judicial competence. More specifically, he
understands this case as similar to prior cases in which the Court has
refused to exercise jurisdiction. The nuance of his argument bears re-
peating: it is not that the Court did not have jurisdiction in these other
cases, but, rather, that "[tihis is one of those demands on judicial power
[that] ... must be resolved by considerations on the basis of which this
Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene in controversies." 10
And what exactly were these considerations? He avers that this issue, as
others before it, is one "of a peculiarly political nature"' "I and thus not
subject to judicial resolution.
His point, which he made clear in the next paragraph, is simple: the
Court is quite adept and well-equipped to handle individual rights claims,
such as claims by one party to recover damages for discriminatory exclu-
sion at the hands of the state. What the Court cannot handle quite as well
are structural claims, claims about the proper structure of the political
system. "The basis for this suit," he offers in support of this proposition,
7 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551 (1946).
8 Id. ("Nothing has now been adduced to lead us to overrule what this Court found to be
the requirements under the Act of 1929, the more so since seven Congressional elections have
been held under the Act of 1929 as construed by this Court.").
9 Id.
10 Id. at 552.
'' Id.
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"is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity. '12
Plaintiffs came to federal court in order to press their claims for a differ-
ent electoral structure, for districts that reflect at the very least substantial
equality of population among them. But this is no easy task, thus raising
concerns about judicial competence.
To begin, he contends that the federal courts could not possibly re-
draw the Illinois congressional districting map. The best they could do
was to declare the existing map unconstitutional and hope for a new map
from the state legislature. But if the legislature fails to draw a new map,
the next election would have to be an at-large election, since they could
not use an unconstitutional plan. Yet such an election would circumvent
the congressional demand for districts. And besides, Congress may ulti-
mately reject these representatives under its article I, section 5 power.
As such, it is best for the courts to decline any involvement in these
charged political controversies. These are disputes where losing par-
tisans are simply inviting the courts into their controversies in order to
get a second chance at a favorable resolution. Using the courts in this
way is "hostile to a democratic system."' 13 Any change must instead
come from Congress, from state legislatures, or apparently from the peo-
ple themselves.' 4
All these arguments amount to the traditional view of Colegrove as
a political question case.15 Yet this is an odd view of Colegrove, particu-
larly because the Court fails to invoke the political question doctrine as
then understood, dating back to Luther v. Borden' 6 and Pacific States v.
Oregon.17 Such an argument on political question grounds would invoke
the classic nonjusticiability thesis, where the Court would profess a lack
of power to intervene. But the Court does no such thing in Colegrove.
To be sure, the Court teases us a bit here, especially when it offers the
view that "[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of gov-
ernment in States cannot be challenged in the courts" while citing Pacific
States.18 But this is hardly a classic "political question" argument. From
12 Id. It is worth noting that this point is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Charles L.
Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE
L.J. 13, 13 (1962).
13 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553.
14 See id. at 556 ("The Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our gov-
ernmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ulti-
mately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights.").
15 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) ("In 1962, in Baker v.
Carr, a case involving the apportionment of the Tennessee legislature, the Supreme Court
departed from its decision in Colegrove v. Green, which had held that reapportionment contro-
versies were political questions.").
16 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
17 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
18 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
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its place in the opinion, it is clear that this argument is part of a now
familiar refrain about enforcing constitutional provisions outside the
courts. 19 This is not a political question argument, at least not in its
traditional form. The Court was refusing to intervene even though it had
the power to do so.20
Once the smoke clears, we have a court deciding not to intervene in
redistricting controversies. But I cannot emphasize enough that the
Court is choosing to take this path. After all, "Courts ought not enter this
political thicket. ' 21 And in fact, nobody denied, then or later, that the
Court had power to act in Colegrove. Justice Frankfurter conceded as
much in his scathing dissent in Baker, when he remarked that "[bloth
opinions joining in the result in Colegrove v. Green agreed that consider-
ations were controlling which dictated denial of jurisdiction though not
in the strict sense of want of power."'22 In his opinion for the Court in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Justice Frankfurter similarly argued that the facts
in Colegrove "presented a subject not meet for adjudication. '23
Thus the real question behind Colegrove: why did Justice Frank-
furter work as hard as he did to extend his deferential posture to redis-
tricting controversies? The answer is not that the Court must treat all
questions of the political process similarly, for Justice Frankfurter him-
self authored the Court's opinion in Gomillion v Lightfoot some years
later, where the Court willingly intervened and struck down the Tus-
kegee racial gerrymander under the Fifteenth Amendment. To be sure,
one can certainly distinguish Gomillion from Colegrove, and Justice
Frankfurter did so effortlessly, on both constitutional and pragmatic
grounds.24 In this vein, it is clear from the historical record that Justice
19 In making this claim, it is clear that Frankfurter was ahead of its time. See MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (Princeton University Press
1999).
20 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Ques-
tions, Prudence and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manu-
script at page 23-24).
21 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
22 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
24 For example, Colegrove arose under Article I, which gave Congress "exclusive au-
thority" to decide the matter. Yet the same may not be said of the "discriminatory denial of
the municipal suffrage alleged here." Frankfurter draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 8 (No-
vember 10, 1960) (Library of Congress (LOC), Warren papers, Box 471, case file no. 32).
Further, Colegrove involved a nation-wide issue, as these partisan struggles "underlie so many
disputes over statewide apportionment throughout the country." Yet Gomillion "solely con-
cerns state-imposed racial discrimination in a specific locale." The fact that Gomillion was a
race case, -where the line drawing resulted "in an unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely
from colored citizens .... lifts this controversy out of the exclusively political arena and into
the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation." Id. The question of remedies provided
for him two final grounds. First, one case is about discrimination through inaction, whereas
the other is about affirmative action. The plaintiffs in Gomillion are targeted, which means
2005]
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Frankfurter wished to open review to race cases such as Gomillion while
ensuring that the Court would not engage in a full scale regulatory as-
sault on the law of democracy. This explains the great lengths to which
he went, at Justice Black's insistence, 25 to distinguish Colegrove from
Gomillion while also responding to Justice Whittaker's contention that
Gomillion was best understood as a Fourteenth Amendment case.26 To
his mind, Gomillion was a race case, a Fifteenth Amendment case, as
indicated in his communication to Justice Whittaker the day after Justice
Whittaker circulated his draft of a concurring opinion,
Displacing voters from Division A, where they enjoyed
rights through the ballot which they would not enjoy in
Division B, presents in fact a very different situation
from originally making two divisions, A and B, and
thereby placing different voters in the two divisions. If
the situation is different in fact I know of nothing that
precludes it from being different in law. Displacing
takes away, deprives of, theretofore existing rights. To
do so on the basis of race is explicitly prohibited by the
Fifteenth Amendment. 27
Justice Whittaker responded to this argument in his subsequent draft
and ultimately remained unpersuaded. 28
This doctrinal debate offers a window into the heart of the reappor-
tionment revolution. Irrespective of which constitutional provision is in-
voked, the redistricting cases are at their core cases of judicial will. That
is to say, these cases amply demonstrate how the Court is choosing when
to intervene and when to stay out of these difficult and contested contro-
versies. For example, while the Court refuses to intervene in Colegrove,
it follows a separate tack in Gomillion and, to be fair, perhaps it had no
choice in light of the nascent civil rights revolution. But why is this so?
Why should the Court stay out of the redistricting area as opposed to any
that "familiar legal remedies are available as relief." And second, the cure may be worse that
the disease in Colegrove, as it may result in at large elections, contrary to congressional will.
Whereas in Gomillion, invalidation of the Act will simply mean that the city will revert to its
old plan. Id.
25 See id. at 1.
26 See Frankfurter Memorandum, Gomillion v. Lightfoot (November 4, 1960) (LOC,
Brennan Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 32).
27 Id.
28 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring) (contending, in re-
sponse to Justice Frankfurter's insistence, that his view of the case "would not involve ... the
Colegrove problem"). Tellingly, he added this mention of Colegrove in response to Justice
Frankfurter's memo from a week before. Cf. Whittaker draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 2
(November 3, 1960) (LOC, Brennan Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 32) with Whittaker draft
opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 2 (November 11, 1960) (LOC, Brennan Papers, Box I: 50, case
file no. 32).
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other? This is to concede that there are times when the Court is wise to
stay its hand. This is Alexander Bickel's point on his reading of the
Court's political question doctrine. 29 Yet even on this account, what
makes redistricting questions the kinds of questions that the Court should
leave unattended? Put another way, why assume that redistricting ques-
tions as a whole should be handled deferentially, if handled at all? It
may be the situation that these cases demand a deference seldom seen in
other areas of constitutional law. Yet shouldn't the Court first engage in
some form of review, however minimal, before deciding to abdicate a
particular redistricting controversy?
II.
The Court consistently refused to answer these questions for de-
cades, choosing instead to offer implicit answers, in the form of short per
curiam opinions.30 Under Justice Frankfurter's careful watch, the force
of the political question doctrine served as the Court's official position
for many years.
Baker v. Carr finally brought this deferential posture to an end; in
the words of Charles Black, Baker "put [Colegrove] accurately in its
place. '31 The facts in Baker were not unique to Tennessee. The state
drew new district lines in 1901 for its state legislature, only to refuse to
do so again. Such neglect, coupled with population shifts within the
state, soon made these lines obsolete. And yet, the state legislature had
very little incentive to intervene and draft a new plan. So it did nothing,
even in the face of clear constitutional commands under the state consti-
tution. Thus, on these facts, one meaning of Baker is quite pragmatic.
With this case, the Court finally showed that it had the will to confront
these recalcitrant political actors. Its constitutional meaning is also
straight-forward: Baker placed redistricting questions on equal footing
with all other controversies. This is not to say that voting is not different
from other areas of the law; it is different. 32 But as far as the majority in
Baker was concerned, redistricting controversies could no longer receive
the deference accorded to them in the past.
In saying this, it is amply clear that the Court was changing course
on the question of judicial will. Although Justice Frankfurter followed a
prudential course in keeping the Court away from political contests in
29 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (Yale University Press
1962).
30 See, e.g., Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (per curiam); Kidd v. McCan-
less, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 202-03 (1962).
31 Black, supra note 12, at 14.
32 See Pamela S. Karlan and Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1201 (1996).
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Colegrove, a new majority clearly disagreed. The new majority believed
that the Court can and should take a more active supervisory role in
redistricting controversies. Yet this new majority was not willing to
move too fast, largely out of deference to Justice Stewart's position.
This is the reason we see the Court plodding through long-standing and
clearly controlling precedent while carefully limiting the reach of its
opinion. Justice Stewart could only go so far. Other justices, while
wishing to go farther, were willing to go as far as five votes would take
them. This meant that a more aggressive posture would have to wait for
another day, giving way to a more cautious and patient approach.
The justices settled on a patient and measured approach early on.
As soon as Justice Brennan finished his draft of the opinion, he initially
circulated it to Justice Stewart, who held the decisive fifth vote. In a
memorandum attached to the draft, Justice Brennan wrote the following:
You will note that I stop with the holding that the com-
plaint states a justiciable cause of action of a denial of
equal protection of the laws according to familiar equal
protection criteria. As drafted it defers consideration of
the application of those criteria and the matter of remedy
for the determination in the first instance of the District
Court after the proofs are in.3 3
In its final draft, the Court did not go any further. It decided the
following: that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction, that the
case presents a justiciable question and that the litigants have standing to
raise this claim.34 Justice Stewart came to this position after some time
and consideration. As Justice Brennan wrote in an internal memorandum
to the justices, "[c]ontrary to his tentative reaction at conference, Potter
now agrees with me that we should not pass on any issues except the
three actually requiring decision at this time."'3 5 Justice Stewart repeated
this point about the reach of the majority opinion in his concurring opin-
ion,36 an opinion he drafted in response to Justice Douglas' own concur-
ring opinion. 37
This discussion about the Court's understanding of its own role
often obscures the far more important point about judicial standards. The
Court was clearly struggling with this difficult question. To Justice
33 Memorandum to Justice Stewart, Baker v. Carr (January 22, 1962) (LOC, Brennan
Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 6).
34 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1962).
35 Memorandum, Baker v. Carr (January 27, 1962) (LOC, Brennan Papers, Box I: 50,
case file no. 6).
36 Id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37 Memorandum to Justice Brennan, Baker v. Carr (February 13, 1962) (LOC, Brennan
Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 6).
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Brennan, the proper standard was one of rationality and whether the plan
was arbitrary and capricious. 38 Justice Douglas believed that this was a
new standard, as "[w]e have usually said 'invidious discrimination.' ,
39
Justice Clark sided with Justice Brennan, as the Tennessee plan resem-
bled a "crazy quilt," devoid of any rational explanation.40 The Court
ultimately settled on this view; policy-makers would only need to pursue
a rational and legitimate state policy in order to meet constitutional pro-
scriptions. This is a very forgiving standard, yet a necessary one in light
of the difficult issues involved. Ultimately, whatever factors were taken
into consideration, they must be legitimate factors, and the plan as a
whole must in fact pursue them.
Justice Brennan made this point in a memorandum to the conference
soon after the second oral argument in the case. In light of the curious
variances in population between seemingly indistinguishable counties,
Justice Brennan asked counsel for the state to explain them. The answer
was quite revealing:
Answering first with the blunt claim of sovereign immu-
nity, counsel then agreed to go to the merits of my ques-
tioning, and, as I remember it, stated that my
calculations were correct, that there was no reason for
the disparate treatment, and that maybe the Legislature
could justify it, but he could not.41
This answer took Justice Brennan to the heart of Baker. "I should
think that at the very least, the data show a picture which Tennessee
should be required to justify if it is to avoid the conclusion that the 1901
38 Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
39 Memorandum to Justice Brennan, Baker v. Carr (January 31, 1962) (LOC, Douglas
Papers, Box 1266, case file no. 6).
40 Baker, 369 U.S. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding that "Tennessee's appor-
tionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis").
41 Memorandum to the Conference, Baker v. Carr 1 (October 12, 1961) (LOC, Brennan
Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 6). The actual exchange went as follows:
The Court: Well, now, how could that be justified, if they're both rural counties?
What would be the factor which - perhaps you might justify a disparity rural-city;
but how do you do it among rural counties?
Mr. Wilson: May it please the Court, we have interposed a plea of sovereign
immunity here, and -
The Court: No, no. Based on the same premise that Mr. Justice Black had, that
this is a justiciable question.
Mr. Wilson: Well, may it please the Court, even some of the appellees here are
not authorized to speak for the State of Tennessee or to explain or to justify why the
legislature has not done this. And if I could answer your Honor's -
The Court: You said you're not authorized, or it couldn't be justified?
Mr. Wilson: Well, both. Maybe it couldn't be. I don't know. But someone
would have to come here and speak for the legislature.
Oral Argument Transcript at 59-60, Baker v. Carr (No. 6) (October 9, 1961).
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Act applied to today's facts, is simple caprice."'42 On its face, this would
be a rather lenient test, designed to account for extreme circumstances as
seen across the country in the early 1960's. Once new redistricting plans
came into being, the courts' role would recede accordingly.
Baker thus offered a loose and flexible standard, and in so doing it
did not enshrine any one theory of representation over any other.43 One
may take this insight further; in the words of Professor Bickel, written in
the wake of Baker, "in the present state of the art, the Court cannot un-
dertake to lay down rules of legislative apportionment." 44 After all, how
would a court decide from among the many relevant considerations, from
equality of population to the design of a stable two-party system or the
balancing of urban and rural interests? 45 A court could not decide among
these considerations, short of elevating one theory of representation over
all others. The Court in Baker recognized this difficulty and for this
reason it offered to intervene only for extreme cases, instances to which
Bickel referred as a "temper tantrum. '46
In the end, it is clear that Justice Brennan was looking towards pop-
ulation equality early on, as seen by the many charts and statistics that
figured prominently in the litigation. 47 Arguments about arbitrariness
and capriciousness were couched in the context of population figures,
which in turn must mean that population figures mattered and deviations
from equality must be explained in some reasonable way. To be clear,
this is only to say that population equality was the starting point. The
better question, and the one that future cases would need to sort out, was
how far this understanding would be taken. As Justice Douglas re-
marked in his concurring opinion, "[u]niversal equality is not the test;
there is room for weighing. '48 Where should the Court draw this diffi-
cult line?
Ill.
One obvious place to draw this line was exactly where the Court
seemed to draw it in Baker: at rationality bounded by population equal-
ity. This is a forgiving line, for it demands only a reasonable explanation
for the contours and population disparities of a given plan. In the case of
Tennessee, this meant that the state needed only to demonstrate a legiti-
mate justification for its redistricting plan. The Court did not think such
42 Memorandum to the Conference, Baker v. Carr 2 (October 12, 1961) (LOC, Brennan
Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 6).
43 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (2004).
44 Bickel, supra note 4, at 42.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 43.
47 See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
48 Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
DOMESTICATING THE GERRYMANDER
a showing was possible, to which Justices Frankfurter and Harlan took
exception.49 Of note, this is exactly where the states understood the line
to be, as did the many lower courts that considered this issue post-
Baker.50
Yet all too soon, the Court left Baker behind. In Reynolds v. Sims 51
and its companion cases, 52 the Court went back on the promise of Baker
and essentially established the equipopulation principle as a constitu-
tional requirement. As the Court wrote, "[flull and effective participa-
tion by all citizens in state government requires... that each citizen have
an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legisla-
ture. ' '53 In agreement with Baker, the Court explained that population
must serve "of necessity" as a point of departure and the "controlling
criterion for judgment" in redistricting cases; 54 the standard was one of
substantial equality. 55 After all, "mathematical nicety is not a constitu-
tional requisite," 56 and equal protection demands that a legislature be
"apportioned sufficiently on a population basis."' 57 Even further, a state
may choose to "overweigh" or dilute a person's vote if pursuant to a
legitimate reason.58 In sum, "the Equal Protection Clause requires that a
State make an honest and god faith effort to construct districts . ..as
nearly of equal population as is practicable." 59
This language tracks closely some notes made by Chief Justice
Warren presumably before penning his first draft of the Reynolds opin-
ion. In his notes, he began by recognizing quite properly that "[t]here
can be no formula for determining whether equal protection has been
afforded."' 60 The Chief Justice was clear about generalities. For example,
the goal was "fair representation of units of government," which immedi-
49 Id. at 266-269 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330-333 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Redistricting
Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1353 (2002).
51 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52 See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of
State of Colo. 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
377 U.S. 656 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964).
53 377 U.S. at 565.
54 Id. at 567.
55 See id. at 568.
56 Id. at 569; see id. at 577 ("Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement.").
57 Id. at 569.
58 See id. at 579 ("So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based
on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some devia-
tions from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the
apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature.").
59 Id. at 577.
60 Notes Made by Chief Justice, Reynolds v. Sims (LOC, Warren Papers, Box 608, case
file no. 508).
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ately placed the principle of equality at the heart of his inquiry. This also
meant that the Court must eschew a "rigid rule," as "[t]here must be
some room for play in the joints." 6' More specifically, a state plan
passes constitutional muster so long as the state makes an "effort to
achieve equality of representation. '62
To this point, the Court was in tune with its Baker opinion. But this
was a mirage, empty words that served to hide the larger import of the
Reynolds opinion. Reassurances aside, and to be fair, the Court spent a
good portion of its opinion doing what Baker failed to do: setting out the
universe of legitimate reasons that may guide redistricters when depart-
ing from strict population equality. But in the end, the Court left very
little room for experimentation. For example, a state may not depart
from equality on the basis of "history, nor economic or other sorts of
group interests;" 63 for geographic considerations; 64 or while seeking to
replicate the federal analogy.65 A state may deviate from strict equality
out of respect for political subdivisions, yet in doing so "the equal popu-
lation principle [can] not [be] diluted in any significant way."'66 Simi-
larly, a state may seek to "insur[e] some voice to political subdivisions,
as political subdivisions; '67 yet cannot submerge population while doing
so.
6 8
In drawing these lines where it did, the Court made clear that its
power stretches as far as a majority of the Court will stretch it.69 These
lines are curious largely because population equality is not in any way
demanded by the equal protection clause, by history, tradition, or prece-
dent.70 And yet, the tone of the Court's opinion, its grandiose yet matter-
of-fact air, belies these criticisms. To the Court, in fact, equality appears
to be a logical extension of the Court's initial incursion into the thicket in
61 Id.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 579-80.
64 See id. at 580.
65 See id. at 573.
66 Id. at 578.
67 Id. at 580.
68 See id. at 581.
69 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
70 The critics on this point span the political spectrum. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 302-
24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980);
Lani Guinier and Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One Vote, in
REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN's ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 208 (E. Joshua Rosen-
kranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., W.W. Norton & Company 1997) ("One person, one vote...
is not an end in itself or an equation of democracy and simple majority rule, as many members
of the current, post-Brennan Court believe."); Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and
Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 711, 773(1963); Michael McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Conse-
quences, 24 HARV. J. L. & Pun. POL'Y 103, 107 (2000).
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Baker.71 After all, under a representative government, "each and every
citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political processes of his State's legislative bodies."' 72 This is heady
stuff, the stuff of legend and classical tracts in political theory. Yet the
Court was only getting started: "To the extent that a citizen's right to
vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. ' 73 Besides, "[1]egislators
represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests."'74 And in case we missed it the
first time: "Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote."
75
Without a doubt, the Court in Reynolds and its companion cases
moved away from the promise of Baker at a very fast clip. After these
decisions, at least one house in every state legislature, sometimes both,
were essentially declared unconstitutional sub silentio, prompting a lead-
ing commentator to remark, "Courts not only have entered the thicket,
they occupy it.' '76 And they still do. Far more telling, however, is the
fact that the occupation took place under a questionable and clearly de-
batable reading of constitutional sources. Equal population is a standard
whose constitutional pedigree is hardly evident. To be fair, one might
argue that the Court in Reynolds made a reasonable judgment in light of
the problem and the issues involved. But we must never forget that,
ultimately, the Court pulled this standard out of thin air.
77
IV.
Once the Court settled on the concept of equal population as its
guiding principle, it became easy to forget the reasons that initially
71 I make this point cautiously, as the Court itself might disagree with the characteriza-
tion. After all, Justice Brennan initially responded to Justice Frankfurter's dissent by adding a
passage to his Baker draft that Chief Justice Warren would later repeat in Reynolds: "Beyond
noting that we cannot say the District Court will be unable to fashion relief if violations of
constitutional rights are found, it is improper at this stage of these proceedings to consider
what remedies might be available if appellants prevail at the trial." Memorandum, Baker v.
Carr (February 1, 1962) (LOC, Brennan Papers, Box I: 50, case file no. 6); see Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964). To the Reynolds Court, this passage meant that the question
of standards - understood in a formulaic sense, as demanding the existence of direct, clear
guidance - remained unaddressed.
72 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (1964).
73 Id. at 567.
74 Id. at 562.
75 Id. at 580.
76 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitu-
tional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 209, 210 (1964); see Nathaniel
Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political Competition and
Representation, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1299, 1301 (2002) ("Measured by their reach and sweep, the
one-person, one-vote cases may represent the Court's most dramatic intervention into politics
in its history.").
77 To be clear, this is not intended as a criticism of the Court or the standard itself but,
rather, as a description of the Court and its work on this score.
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brought the Court into the thicket. It bears repeating: all along, the early
reapportionment cases sought expression for the sensible goal of "fair
and effective" representation. 78 Reynolds explained as much, even while
implicitly endorsing two further goals, formal political equality and ma-
jority rule.79 This is a worthy goal, yet it is also an intractable one.80
What makes a redistricting plan "fair" or "effective," for example, and
how would a court go about measuring so? For this reason, courts must
tread these difficult waters carefully, cognizant of their limitations and of
the difficulties that inhere in this area. Judicial humility should be the
order of the day. 81
I do not mean to suggest that the case law post-Reynolds was exclu-
sively concerned with issues of representation writ large. Early on, the
Court continued to struggle with the boundary problem and particularly
with the doctrinal limits of population equality. In 1967, for example,
the Court held in three separate cases, per Justice Douglas, that popula-
tion equality was not demanded for local government elections.8 2 Yet
the following year, in Avery v. Midland County,8 3 the Court extended for
the first time the equality principle to local governing bodies. This ex-
ample highlights first and foremost the judicial struggle over the equi-
population principle and its reach across the many layers of government.
In subsequent years, the Court strengthened the principle as applied to
congressional districting plans, 84 but relaxed it for state plans. 85
Yet even as the Court fine-tuned its Reynolds equipopulation juris-
prudence, the concept of representation and its practical application
across the multiple spheres and structures of American politics remained
at the heart of the Court's work. A vivid example of this continued at-
tention is found in cases where the Court examined whether the use of
floterial districts and multimember districts, combined with single-mem-
78 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; see Dixon, supra note 76, at 210 ("Fair representation is
the ultimate goal.").
79 See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Propor-
tional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257, 265 (1985).
80 See, e.g., HANNAH FENICHEL PrrOiN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (University of
California Press 1967); NANCY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND THE BURGER YEARS
(University of Michigan Press 1991).
81 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, "Fair Rep-
resentation," and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 527 (2003).
82 See Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S.
105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
83 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
84 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969).
85 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
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ber districts, violated the Constitution.86 And in the meantime, a much
larger problem lay doctrinally dormant, the question of the constitution-
ality of the gerrymander. This was the question branded by Justice
Douglas as "the other half of Reynolds v. Sims. '" 87 In fact, the question
of the gerrymander presented the Court with a question about "fair and
effective representation" in its truest form.
The Court was keenly aware from the time it entered the thicket in
Baker of the gerrymander lurking in every corner. Yet it refused to con-
sider the constitutional issue time and again. 88 For one, the Court prop-
erly recognized that the task of drawing district lines was both difficult
and devoid of "fair" answers. This is a difficult task because politics are
part and parcel of the redistricting process. As such, the central claim
against a gerrymandered plan is not that political considerations infused
this process, but that politics overwhelmed all other considerations. Sim-
ilarly, the Court seemed to recognize that all redistricting is gerryman-
dering,89 as the central purpose of drawing lines is to achieve a "more
'politically fair' . . . result" 90 than otherwise would result from at-large
elections. If the lines could make a resulting plan more politically fair,
of course, they could also fall short and reward a party with seats incom-
mensurate to their voting strength in a given election.
These considerations in mind, and perhaps naively, the Court sought
to monitor the area cheaply. Soon after Reynolds, it bypassed myriad
opportunities to render a definitive constitutional ruling on the gerryman-
dering question, 91 choosing instead to apply pressure on redistricting ac-
tors through the equipopulation principle.92 But this was not nearly
enough, at least in order to placate the concerns of many, including mem-
bers of the Court themselves. This was clearly not the way to achieve
86 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973).
87 Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 176 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result
in part).
88 For courts who so understood the Court's doctrinal stance, see Cummings v. Meskill,
341 F.Supp. 139, 149 (D. Conn. 1972) (citing Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 322
F.Supp. 428 (N.D.Ill.1971) and Skolnick v. Mayor & City Council of Chicago, 319 F.Supp.
1219, 1229 (N.D.Ill.1970)); see also id. (contending that Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971)
and Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124 "also seem to indicate that claims based purely on political gerry-
mandering would be extremely difficult to sustain if justiciable at all").
89 See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITCS 462 (Oxford University Press 1968).
90 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
91 See, e.g., Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S.
542, 544 (1969).
92 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Cox v. Larios, 124 S.Ct. 2806, 2808
(2004) (contending that "the equal population principle remains the only clear limitation on
improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength"); Samuel
Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71
TEX. L. REv. 1643, 1645 (1993).
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the goal of fair and effective representation that anchored the Court's
initial intervention in Baker. The Court ultimately addressed the ques-
tion head on - and of necessity the general question of group representa-
tion - in Davis v. Bandemer.93 In so doing, Bandemer was part and
parcel of the Court's reapportionment revolution. 94
And yet, by most accounts, Bandemer was a disaster. 95 The prob-
lem itself was difficult enough: how to operationalize a working standard
for judging gerrymandering claims? This problem was and remains a
difficult question because at its root, this is a structural question about
the concept of representation. 96 Once all the votes are counted, what
should the resulting representative body look like? Short of a move to a
system of proportional representation,97 answers are hardly evident or
universal. It is thus no surprise to see the Court struggle as it did,
splintering along various axes while failing to offer clear guidance to
future courts and state actors. This struggle foretold the fortune of the
gerrymander in court, as seen eighteen years later in Vieth v. Jubelirer.98
V.
Vieth is only the most recent installment of the Court's difficult and
contentious struggle to define and implement a regime of fair and equal
representation. The case offers a paradigmatic example of the difficul-
ties that inhere in the gerrymandering area, as well as the existing judi-
cial ambivalence in policing the famed thicket. It also displays an
impatience seldom seen in our constitutional law. In an era when the
Court feels quite comfortable policing innumerable fields of social pol-
icy, this field gives the Court great pause. Yet the Court never explains
with any precision why this is so. Instead, it simply professes an inabil-
ity to develop judicially manageable standards. But this is hardly
enough. In light of the example offered by the Court's initial entry into
the thicket in Baker and its subsequent development of clearer standards
in Reynolds, as well as the general development of standards writ large in
constitutional law, this argument has very little purchase. If the Court
could develop and enforce a standard post-Baker, there is very little rea-
93 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (referring to the "desirability of fair group representation").
94 See Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITIcAL GER-
RYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 11 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
95 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 283 (2004) (citing numerous sources).
96 This insight raises questions about recent calls for more competitive districts. After
all, under competitive districts, representation might be more difficult to achieve as a working
goal. See Persily et al., supra note 76, at 1320-21.
97 Sandy Levinson makes this point in Levinson, supra note 79.
98 541 U.S. 267, 283 (2004).
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son to suspect that it could not do the same now.99 Something else must
be at work in the case.
One answer may be, as I have argued elsewhere, that the Vieth plu-
rality is expressing an implicit desire for the Court to vacate the field of
politics once and for all. 1°° In articulating an inability to develop stan-
dards, the plurality points the doctrine back to Colegrove and traditional
accounts of the political question doctrine. In this vein, it is also true as a
general proposition that the Court as an institution "seems firm in its trust
of both the structure and outcomes of the political process."' 10 1 The re-
mainder of this essay makes two related points. First, it argues that
Vieth-and Bandemer, for that matter-is a modem rendition of the
same issues that plagued the Court in Baker. Second, it contends that the
implications of a view of the Court as democratic engineer in charge of
regulating the structure of our democracy should give us great pause.
The first point looks with some care to Baker v. Carr and the rea-
sons that led the Court to intervene. Baker makes the most sense-and
it's in fact indispensable-when viewed as a redistricting lock-out
case, 102 in which the incumbent legislators refuse to draw a new district-
ing plan in order to protect their future electoral success. The relevant
actors in Tennessee did not act because any action would place their
legislative tenures in peril. Their inaction thus amounted to a bipartisan
gerrymandering of sorts, or a "silent gerrymander," 10 3 for the goal was to
protect those already in power irrespective of party affiliation. In re-
sponse to these extreme facts, the Court could make very modest de-
mands, and it did precisely that. Under Baker, policy-makers would only
need to pursue a rational and legitimate state policy in order to meet
constitutional proscriptions. This is a very forgiving standard, yet a nec-
essary one in light of the difficult issues involved.
This argument takes us directly to the Court's handling of the gerry-
mandering question. From the beginning, the Court displayed a great
deal of self-restraint in this area, perhaps out of due deference to the
difficult questions presented. This hesitancy should not in any way be
99 See Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the
Thicket at Last, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 242 ("As the majority correctly perceived, the deci-
sion that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable flows ineluctably from the Court's
earlier judgments that cases raising claims of population inequality among districts and of
racial gerrymandering are justiciable.")
100 See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 20.
101 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Trusting Democracy 23 (draft on file).
102 See Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN L. REV. 643 (1998). In this context, I prefer Bruce Cain's
formulation of the problem as a lockout, which shuts minor parties out of the process alto-
gether, rather than lockups, which serve to disadvantage them. See Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's
Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1601 (1999).
103 Leroy C. Hardy, Considering the Gerrymander, 4 PEpP. L. REV. 243, 249 (1977).
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interpreted as the Court's implicit agreement with the underlying issues,
for it was often coupled with clear misgivings about the wisdom of the
gerrymander. Bandemer offers a perfect example, for the population
numbers at issue there were not of an egregious kind, and the relevant
political actors could offer legitimate and rational reasons for drafting the
plan as they did. And yet the Court also made clear its worries about the
consistent degradation of voters' influence in the political process, 104 the
effective denial of influence, 10 5 or the "continued frustration" of majority
will.1°6 This language makes sense in the context of Baker v. Carr and
the reasons for which the Court came into the thicket. The problem then
was the fact that a voting minority was able to hold onto power
indefinitely.
In this way, Baker offers a direct link to the recent Pennsylvania
redistricting case, Vieth v. Jubelirer. Vieth fits under Baker's umbrella
on a reading of Baker as failing to demarcate the universe of legitimate
and illegitimate reasons that redistricting actors may follow. This is a
structural reading of Baker, and I find it particularly attractive. In this
vein, Vieth would only need to follow the path of Shaw v. Reno 10 7 and
conclude that while political considerations may infuse the redistricting
process, it must not overwhelm it. Put another way: as in Baker, where
the Court concluded that the challenged redistricting map could not be
explained in a rational and logical way, the Court would only need to
conclude that extreme partisanship, like extreme racialism, is an illegiti-
mate state interest in order to hold for the Vieth plaintiffs. Yet the Court
was clearly uninterested in seriously engaging this or similar arguments.
Vieth v. Jubelirer is difficult to take at face value, and not only
because the Court has been all too happy to enter into similar subfields
within the law of democracy in the recent past.'0 8 Far more difficult to
explain is the fact that Vieth raises many of the questions opened up to
judicial review in Baker. The point then, as now, is how far the Court
will go in regulating the law of democracy. To be sure, Vieth only re-
quired a judicial recognition of any political limits on redistricting actors.
That was Baker v. Carr, and it was also what the plaintiffs were asking
the Court to do in Vieth. Yet, while in Baker the Court recognized some
loose and flexible limits, the Vieth Court could not reach consensus on
any such limits. Further, the claim in Vieth, as in Baker and its progeny,
104 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
105 See id. at 133.
106 Id.
107 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
108 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); see Spencer Overton, Re-
straint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
663 (2004).
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was grounded on the tension between the notion of fair representation
and partisan districting. It is hard to draw a precise and coherent line
between the two cases. Although the Court in Baker chooses to inter-
vene, the Court in Vieth chooses not to. This leads me to the conclusion
that the central question in the case must be one of judicial will.
The second point takes issue with the implications of this conclu-
sion. We live at a time when, in the words of Rick Pildes, "it has be-
come routine for the Court to conclude that constitutional law should
determine the institutional arrangements of democracy." 10 9 The Court is
at the epicenter of our democracy, regulating and fine-tuning the struc-
turing of our democratic institutions. This is fine as a general proposi-
tion, I suppose, yet it quickly breaks down as a descriptive matter. After
all, one can make a very sensible claim for judicial intervention in many
spheres, and the gerrymandering area appears to be a leading candidate.
The classic defense here is John Hart Ely's elegant argument for ensur-
ing that the channels of political change remain open and free. 110 One
could suggest, as did Professor Ely, that the gerrymandering context of-
fers a paradigmatic example of his thesis, with insiders rigging the sys-
tem in order to insulate themselves from the electorate. And yet the
Court refuses to intervene. Why the hesitation?
This question is further complicated by the Court itself and its vi-
sion of democracy at the heart of its electoral jurisprudence. The Court's
view of democracy in other fora, such as the blanket primary and third
party cases, is a view of our politics as disorderly and unstructured.
Under such assumptions, the Court takes on the role of a white knight,
willing and able save us even from ourselves.' 1 ' This is a troubling and
debatable view of the judicial role, and I do not intend to endorse it in
any way. Rather, I wish to underscore how the Court refuses to apply a
similar view of our politics to redistricting, a forum where chaos and
disorder run rampant.' 12 If we took the Court at its word elsewhere, we
109 Pildes, supra note 1, at 177.
110 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (Harvard University Press 1980).
111 See Pildes, supra note 1, at 186.
112 If the recent episode in Texas does not suffice for support of this point, see also An-
drew Gelman and Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 541, 541 (1994):
In 1982, the Michigan Supreme Court imposed a redistricting plan on their state that
was generally believed to favor the Republicans. The Democrats' alternative mea-
sure had to pass the legislature with a two-thirds vote, which was difficult even
though they had a majority in both houses. Democratic leaders tried to sneak
through the legislation by gutting the contents, but not the title, of an irrelevant bill
at the last minute and inserting redistricting legislation. The Republicans discovered
this ploy, making the situation extremely tense. In the heat of the long debate during
this midnight session, a Democratic senator collapsed. Paramedics were called in,
but he refused to leave the Senate floor before the vote. In a classic case of political
hardball, a Republican senator used parliamentary procedure to delay the vote by
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have reason to expect strong and aggressive judicial intervention in the
redistricting context as well. Instead, we get judicial chaos and disorder,
as demonstrated by the badly splintered Vieth opinion. Again, how to
explain it?
This point is muddied by yet another complication. In deciding
these cases, members of the Court are guided by their world views and
cultural assumptions about the institutional arrangements of American-
style Democracy.' 13 Yet these assumptions and world-views are not uni-
versally shared. Consider, for example, California Democratic Party v.
Jones,' 14 where the Court examined California's blanket primary. Thir-
teen federal judges examined the primary, and six of them thought the
primary constitutional, while seven of them concluded that it was not. It
so happens that the seven who sided against the primary sit on the U.S.
Supreme Court, and therefore the citizens of California were deprived of
the very institution they approved via initiative four years earlier. This is
a curious democratic outcome, to say the least.
In the end, the essay closes on an ambivalent note. In Vieth, the
Court refuses to intervene in a gerrymandering dispute, feigning an in-
ability to formulate judicially manageable and discernible standards.
This position is open to criticism, or so this essay argues, for Vieth is part
and parcel of the Court's reapportionment revolution. One question from
Vieth is why the Court refuses to answer questions that fit squarely
within its purview. An easy answer is that the Court's refusal to domes-
ticate the gerrymander stems not from doctrinal or prudential considera-
tions but a manifest unwillingness to do so. If and when the Court
decides to plunge into this particular abyss, however, it is imperative that
we ask a prior question. In light of the Court's general performance in
the field of democracy, and its propensity to wield its power in accor-
dance to its idiosyncratic views of the political process and the maladies
that corrupt it: do we really want the Court doing our bidding?
insisting that the legal description of all 148 legislative districts and their boundaries
be read into the record. Despite his failing health, the Democratic senator stayed
through the entire proceeding, and his party won the vote.
113 See Pildes, supra note I, at 166.
114 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
